

Estimating within-cluster and between-cluster spillover effects in randomized saturation designs

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Outline

Introduction

Causal estimands

Estimation

Theoretical properties


Covariate adjustment

Empirical analysis: cash transfer experiment in Kenya


Discussion

Motivating example: large-scale cash transfer experiment in rural Kenya (Egger et al., 2022)

- ▶ Two-stage *randomized saturation* design:
 - ▶ **Stage 1:** Sublocations randomized to high and low saturation.
 - ▶ **Stage 2:** Villages randomized to treatment at the assigned saturation rate.
- ▶ Geography (markets, labor, mobility) induces interference *within* and *between* sublocations.



Spatial exposure to treatment



- ▶ Evidence of meaningful spillovers on non-recipient households and local markets.
- ▶ Positive effects on local enterprise activity and consumption reported.

Randomized saturation designs

- ▶ Randomize treatment in two stages ([Hudgens and Halloran, 2008](#); [Baird et al., 2018](#); [Basse and Feller, 2018](#)):
 1. Stage 1 (cluster level): Randomize clusters (communities, schools, villages, networks) to different saturation levels (high vs. low coverage).
 2. Stage 2 (unit level): Randomize individual units within each cluster to treatment, according to the assigned saturation rate.
- ▶ Enables identification of both direct and spillover effects.

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 2. Stage 2 (unit level): Randomize individual units within each cluster to treatment, according to the assigned saturation rate.
- ▶ Enables identification of both direct and spillover effects.
- ▶ Widely-used in public health and social sciences: deworming on health ([Miguel and Kremer, 2004](#)), vaccination on health ([Ali et al., 2005](#)), labor market policies on displacement ([Crépon et al., 2013](#)), school governance on learning ([Pradhan et al., 2014](#)), microcredit on business outcomes ([Banerjee et al., 2015](#)), education on fertility ([Duflo et al., 2015](#)), cash transfers on school attendance ([Barrera-Osorio et al., 2019](#)).

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- ▶ Common assumption in prior work: spillovers **only** occur within clusters, no interference between clusters.
- ▶ Not reasonable in many cases:
 - ▶ Real-world clusters are rarely isolated.
 - ▶ Networks, mobility, markets, or environmental channels can connect units across cluster boundaries.
 - ▶ Ignoring between-cluster interference can bias effect estimates and mislead policy conclusions.

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- ▶ **Inference**: closed-form asymptotic variance and covariance, joint CLT under network dependence, conservative variance estimators, and Wald CIs.
- ▶ **Empirical re-analysis** of [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#): large-scale cash transfer experiment in rural Kenya. Geographic spillovers are economically meaningful and effects are highly heterogeneous across exposure environments.

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- ▶ Finite population regime: $\{Y_i(\mathbf{a})\}$ fixed; randomness comes from \mathbf{A} .
- ▶ Without further structure, 2^n potential outcomes per unit.

Exposure mapping

- ▶ Adopt an exposure mapping to reduce dimensionality:

$$d_i(\mathbf{A}) = (A_i, S_i, H_i),$$

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 - ▶ H_i : between-cluster summary, e.g., whether $> 1/2$ villages are treated among those geographically close to i but located in different sublocations.
- ▶ Potential outcome reduces to $Y_i(a, s, h)$.

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- ▶ All depend on the design through $\text{pr}(S_i, H_i \mid A_i, \dots)$.

Policy-specific direct and indirect effects

- ▶ For a given treatment policy ψ , define

$$DE_{\psi} = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n E_{\psi} \{ Y_i(1, S_i, H_i) \mid A_i = 1 \} - n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n E_{\psi} \{ Y_i(0, S_i, H_i) \mid A_i = 0 \},$$

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- ▶ subscript ψ : $E_{\psi}(\cdot \mid \cdot)$ is taken under the conditional distribution induced by ψ .
- ▶ Comparison between different policies ψ_1 and ψ_2 , e.g., $DE_{\psi_1} - DE_{\psi_2}$.

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- ▶ Conditional effects: differences of $\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h)$
 - ▶ e.g., $\hat{D}\hat{E}^*(s, h) = \hat{Y}^*(1, s, h) - \hat{Y}^*(0, s, h)$ for $* \in \{\text{ht}, \text{haj}\}$.

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$$\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a', s', h') = \text{pr}\{(A_i, S_i, H_i) = (a, s, h), (A_j, S_j, H_j) = (a', s', h')\}.$$

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- ▶ Practical solution: simulate via Monte Carlo from the known design ([Aronow and Samii, 2017](#)).
 - ▶ Draw B assignment vectors $\mathbf{A}^{(b)}$ following the two-stage design.
 - ▶ Compute $S_i^{(b)}, H_i^{(b)}$ on the network for each draw.
 - ▶ Estimate $\hat{\pi}_i(a, s, h) = B^{-1} \sum_b \mathbb{1}\{A_i^{(b)} = a, S_i^{(b)} = s, H_i^{(b)} = h\}$.

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- ▶ With $\gamma_i \equiv 1$, recover the conditional-effect estimators.

Choice of weights

- ▶ Use policy-induced conditional probabilities as weights:

$$\gamma_{i,\psi}^{\text{DE}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{h}) = \text{pr}_{\psi}(S_i = s, H_i = h \mid A_i = a),$$

$$\gamma_{i,\psi}^{\text{WIE}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{h}) = \text{pr}_{\psi}(H_i = h \mid A_i = a, S_i = s),$$

$$\gamma_{i,\psi}^{\text{BIE}}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{h}) = \text{pr}_{\psi}(S_i = s \mid A_i = a, H_i = h).$$

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- ▶ Computed via the same Monte Carlo simulation from the design.

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$$\gamma_{i,\psi}^{\text{WIE}}(a, s, h) = \text{pr}_{\psi}(H_i = h \mid A_i = a, S_i = s),$$

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- ▶ Computed via the same Monte Carlo simulation from the design.
- ▶ Can be used to construct estimators for policy-specific effects: for $* \in \{\text{ht}, \text{haj}\}$,

$$\widehat{\text{DE}}_{\psi}^* = \sum_{s,h=0,1} \{ \hat{Y}^*(1, s, h; \Gamma_{\psi}^{\text{DE}}) - \hat{Y}^*(0, s, h; \Gamma_{\psi}^{\text{DE}}) \},$$

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- ▶ In-policy marginal effects: a special case with the implemented policy.

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- ▶ Bounded potential outcomes: $|Y_i(a, s, h)| \leq C_Y$ for all i and (a, s, h) .

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- ▶ Positivity: $\underline{c}_\pi \leq \pi_i(a, s, h) \leq \bar{c}_\pi < 1$ for all i and (a, s, h) .
- ▶ Bounded network degree: $\max_i |\{j : k_j = k_i\} \cup \mathcal{G}_i| \leq \Delta < \infty$.
 - ▶ k_i : sublocation that village i belongs to.
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 - ▶ Sparsity: each unit has only finitely many neighbors.
 - ▶ In the application: $\Delta \approx 20$ (sublocation + neighbors within 4 km).
- ▶ Bounded order of dependence: there exists $m < \infty$ such that $(A_i, S_i, H_i) \perp\!\!\!\perp (A_j, S_j, H_j)$ whenever i, j are graph distance $> m$.
 - ▶ Dependence does not propagate indefinitely; key for graph-dependent CLT.
 - ▶ In the application: $m = 2$.

Asymptotic variance: Horvitz–Thompson

- For the Horvitz–Thompson estimator:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{var}\{\hat{Y}^{\text{ht}}(a, s, h; \Gamma)\} &= \underbrace{n^{-2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1 - \pi_i(a, s, h)}{\pi_i(a, s, h)} \{\gamma_i(a, s, h) Y_i(a, s, h)\}^2}_{\text{contribution from the variation of unit } i} \\ &+ \underbrace{n^{-2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a, s, h) - \pi_i(a, s, h)\pi_j(a, s, h)}{\pi_i(a, s, h)\pi_j(a, s, h)} \times \gamma_i(a, s, h)\gamma_j(a, s, h) Y_i(a, s, h) Y_j(a, s, h)}_{\text{contribution from the covariance between units due to interference}} \end{aligned}$$

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- ▶ Compact quadratic form:

$$\text{var}\{\hat{Y}^{\text{ht}}(a, s, h; \Gamma)\} = n^{-2} \mathbf{Y}(a, s, h)^{\text{T}} \mathbf{\Gamma}(a, s, h) \mathbf{\Lambda}(a, s, h) \mathbf{\Gamma}(a, s, h) \mathbf{Y}(a, s, h).$$

Asymptotic variance: Hájek estimator

- ▶ For the Hájek estimator: same form, but with **centered** potential outcomes

$$Y_i^{\text{haj}}(a, s, h) = Y_i(a, s, h) - \frac{n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i(a, s, h) Y_i(a, s, h)}{n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i(a, s, h)}.$$

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- ▶ Compactly:

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- ▶ The centering reduces the magnitude of the quadratic form \Rightarrow explains why Hájek is usually *more stable* in finite samples.

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$$\begin{aligned} & \text{cov}\{\hat{Y}^{\text{ht}}(a, s, h; \Gamma), \hat{Y}^{\text{ht}}(a', s', h'; \Gamma)\} \\ &= \underbrace{-n^{-2} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i(a, s, h) \gamma_i(a', s', h') Y_i(a, s, h) Y_i(a', s', h')}_{\text{covariance of different potential outcomes for the same unit } i} \\ &+ n^{-2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a', s', h') - \pi_i(a, s, h) \pi_j(a', s', h')}{\pi_i(a, s, h) \pi_j(a', s', h')} \\ &\quad \times \underbrace{\gamma_i(a, s, h) \gamma_j(a', s', h') Y_i(a, s, h) Y_j(a', s', h')}_{\text{covariance of different potential outcomes between units}} \end{aligned}$$

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- ▶ Hájek covariance: Same form but with centered potential outcomes $Y_i^{\text{haj}}(a, s, h)$ and $Y_j^{\text{haj}}(a', s', h')$.

Joint consistency and CLT

Theorem (Consistency & asymptotic normality). Under the regularity conditions and non-degeneracy of the asymptotic variance, for $* \in \{\text{ht}, \text{haj}\}$:

1. Consistency: $\hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\Gamma}^* - \bar{\mathbf{Y}}_{\Gamma} \xrightarrow{P} 0$.
2. Joint asymptotic normality:

$$\text{acov}(\hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\Gamma}^*)^{-1/2} (\hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\Gamma}^* - \bar{\mathbf{Y}}_{\Gamma}) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, I_8),$$

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- ▶ Proof uses the graph-dependent CLT of [Chen and Shao \(2004\)](#).
- ▶ All proposed estimators (conditional, in-policy marginal, policy-specific) are consistent and asymptotically normal by the continuous mapping theorem and the delta method.

Conservative variance estimator

- ▶ Define $\Omega(a, s, h)$:

$$\Omega_{ij}(a, s, h) = \frac{\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a, s, h) - \pi_i(a, s, h)\pi_j(a, s, h)}{\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a, s, h)},$$

- ▶ $\pi_{ii}(a, s, h; a, s, h) = \pi_i(a, s, h)$, so diagonal = $1 - \pi_i(a, s, h)$.

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$$\widehat{\text{se}}^2\{\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h; \Gamma)\} = n^{-2}(\hat{\mathbf{Y}}^*)^T \mathbf{\Gamma}(a, s, h) \mathbf{\Omega}(a, s, h) \mathbf{\Gamma}(a, s, h) \hat{\mathbf{Y}}^*,$$

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- ▶ Cross-level covariance is unidentifiable for *contrasts*.
 - ▶ Use Cauchy–Schwarz to obtain a **conservative** bound:

$$\widehat{\text{var}}\{\widehat{\text{DE}}^*(s, h)\} = \left[\widehat{\text{se}}\{\hat{Y}^*(1, s, h)\} + \widehat{\text{se}}\{\hat{Y}^*(0, s, h)\} \right]^2.$$

Asymptotically valid Wald confidence intervals

Corollary. Under the regularity conditions, positivity of second-order inclusion probabilities $\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a, s, h) > 0$, and non-degeneracy:

1. For each (a, s, h) and $* \in \{ht, haj\}$,

$$n[\hat{\text{var}}\{\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h; \Gamma)\} - \text{avar}\{\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h; \Gamma)\}] = o_p(1),$$

and the Wald CI $\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h; \Gamma) \pm z_{\alpha/2} \hat{\text{se}}\{\hat{Y}^*(a, s, h; \Gamma)\}$ has asymptotic coverage exactly $1 - \alpha$.

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2. For **conditional** and **policy-specific** effects, the Cauchy–Schwarz-based variance estimator yields CIs with asymptotic coverage *at least* $1 - \alpha$.
- If $\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a, s, h) = 0$ for some pair, single-cell variance is also not consistently estimable; can use the [Aronow and Samii \(2017\)](#) construction.

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- ▶ In spirit of Lin's interacted regression; rigorous analysis of efficiency under interference is ongoing work.

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Re-analysis of Egger et al. (2022)

- ▶ $n = 653$ villages, 155 sublocations, two counties in rural Kenya, 2014–2017.
 - ▶ 328 treated, 325 control villages.
 - ▶ High-saturation sublocations: 2/3 villages treated; low-saturation: 1/3.

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- ▶ Build the geographic exposure H_i :
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- ▶ Estimate $\pi_i(a, s, h)$ and $\pi_{ij}(a, s, h; a', s', h')$ via $B = 100,000$ Monte Carlo draws.
- ▶ Two estimators reported: Hájek, covariate-adjusted.

Estimated propensity scores

Exposure	Mean	Std	Median
$(A_i = 0, S_i = 0, H_i = 0)$	0.184	0.175	0.137
$(A_i = 0, S_i = 0, H_i = 1)$	0.143	0.141	0.099
$(A_i = 0, S_i = 1, H_i = 0)$	0.088	0.062	0.071
$(A_i = 0, S_i = 1, H_i = 1)$	0.086	0.068	0.068
$(A_i = 1, S_i = 0, H_i = 0)$	0.118	0.078	0.088
$(A_i = 1, S_i = 0, H_i = 1)$	0.098	0.065	0.078
$(A_i = 1, S_i = 1, H_i = 0)$	0.139	0.143	0.069
$(A_i = 1, S_i = 1, H_i = 1)$	0.144	0.154	0.051
<i>Marginal probabilities</i>			
$\text{pr}(A_i = 1)$	0.499	0.167	0.500
$\text{pr}(S_i = 1)$	0.458	0.342	0.500
$\text{pr}(H_i = 1)$	0.471	0.224	0.500

- ▶ Lower-tail of joint propensities is small; positivity is plausible but tight in some cells.

Conditional direct effects $\hat{D}\hat{E}^*(s, h)$

(s, h)	Hájek				Covariate-adjusted			
	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage
(0, 0)	-360 (909)	-46 (1,143)	200 (135)	163 (116)	-101 (883)	217 (1,117)	172 (137)	136 (117)
(0, 1)	-558 (616)	300 (877)	329** (168)	268* (145)	-835 (559)	-124 (696)	260* (148)	211 (131)
(1, 0)	3,539*** (1,263)	4,159*** (1,247)	87 (169)	23 (159)	2,817** (1,268)	3,043*** (1,167)	-150 (157)	-181 (149)
(1, 1)	-227 (688)	140 (825)	115 (158)	73 (134)	37 (677)	481 (776)	142 (153)	95 (131)

- ▶ Large positive direct effect on profits/revenue at $(S, H) = (1, 0)$: high local saturation, low geographic exposure.
- ▶ Cost/wage effects are positive at $(0, 1)$: competition for inputs/labor when nearby villages are treated.

Conditional within-cluster indirect effects $\widehat{WIE}^*(a, h)$

(a, h)	Hájek				Covariate-adjusted			
	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage
(0, 0)	-182 (837)	-304 (961)	132 (170)	134 (148)	67 (823)	363 (943)	333** (159)	304*** (140)
(0, 1)	-1,136* (671)	-1,579* (813)	-92 (138)	-67 (121)	-1,333** (654)	-1,728** (750)	-76 (132)	-50 (116)
(1, 0)	3,718*** (1,335)	3,902*** (1,429)	18 (134)	-6 (127)	2,985** (1,327)	3,189** (1,342)	11 (134)	-13 (126)
(1, 1)	-805 (633)	-1,738** (889)	-306 (188)	-262* (158)	-461 (581)	-1,124 (722)	-194 (169)	-166 (147)

- ▶ Treated villages with low geographic exposure benefit substantially from high local saturation.
- ▶ Among control villages with high H , increased local saturation *reduces* profits and revenues (competitive pressure from treated neighbors).

Conditional between-cluster indirect effects $B\hat{E}^*(a, s)$

(a, s)	Hájek				Covariate-adjusted			
	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage
(0, 0)	1,330** (554)	1,950*** (645)	222** (93)	176** (83)	1,442*** (511)	1,998*** (555)	204** (86)	161** (76)
(0, 1)	375 (954)	674 (1,128)	-2 (214)	-25 (186)	42 (967)	-92 (1,138)	-204 (205)	-194 (180)
(1, 0)	1,132 (971)	2,296* (1,374)	350* (209)	282 (178)	708 (930)	1,658 (1,258)	293* (199)	236 (172)
(1, 1)	-3,391*** (997)	-3,344*** (944)	26 (112)	25 (106)	-2,739*** (978)	-2,654*** (805)	88 (104)	83 (101)

- ▶ Control villages in low-saturation sublocations benefit from proximity to treated villages, possibly due to increased economic activity.
- ▶ Treated villages in high-saturation sublocations are negatively affected by additional geographic exposure: negative competitive spillover.

In-policy marginal effects

	Hájek				Covariate-adjusted			
	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage
$\hat{D}E$	336 (1,052)	811 (1,242)	164 (232)	121 (205)	289 (995)	656 (1,119)	99 (215)	64 (191)
$\hat{W}IE$	-763 (710)	-1,146 (855)	53 (168)	74 (149)	-689 (686)	-835 (818)	142 (155)	148 (137)
$\hat{B}IE$	358 (1,138)	601 (1,321)	75 (217)	61 (190)	436 (1,060)	565 (1,160)	1 (206)	-6 (181)

- ▶ No marginal effect is statistically significant: averaging *dilutes* the highly heterogeneous conditional signals.

Outline

Introduction

Causal estimands

Estimation

Theoretical properties

Covariate adjustment

Empirical analysis: cash transfer experiment in Kenya

Discussion

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 - ▶ Marginal effects can mask important heterogeneity.
- ▶ **Future directions:** continuous / multi-level exposures, formal model-assisted covariate adjustment under interference and regression analysis for randomized saturation designs.

Thank you very much!

Comments and questions welcome.

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.19573>

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What if we ignored between-cluster interference?

Reduced exposure mapping (A_i, S_i) (4 cells), Hájek estimator:

	Profit	Revenue	Costs	Wage
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- ▶ Geographic spillovers absorbed into noise; risk of attenuation and misinterpretation.